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Write Conference Paper 
What is a “Christian” Jurisprudence? 
 
Hi everyone.  My paper is entitled ‘What is a “Christian” Jurisprudence’?  The term 
‘jurisprudence’ is derived etymologically from the Latin juris, meaning law, and prudentia, 
meaning wisdom.  So jurisprudence simply means the wisdom of the law, or, as it has come 
to mean in scholarly legal circles these days, the theory of law.  It asks fundamental questions 
regarding the nature and definition of law.  And so, the question I wish to pose to us today is 
what does a truly “Christian” theory of law look like?  One that is faithful to, as taken from 
the conference brochure, the “historic Christian faith” in its “principles and practice”.  To 
contextualise this question, I must give you a deceptively brief and superficial overview of 
prevailing theories of law – and for those of you who know more about the topic, I apologise 
for the crass nature of my summary – time prevents me from doing any more. 
 
With a number of nuances and variants which we cannot explore here, there are two primary 
‘theories’ of law.  The first is called “positivism”, and this is the theory which largely 
undergirds the modern liberal, secular legal system.  In positivism, the law has no necessary 
connection with morality or any ‘higher power’.  The law is simply that which is 
promulgated, or “posited”, by the sovereign – whether that is a monarch, parliament, or 
whatever mechanism is in place.  There is no question of justice in regard to this theory of 
law, or whether the law is right or wrong, or ‘should’ be obeyed.  On positivism, the law 
which is validly in force is to be obeyed, usually with a threat of some sort of sanction if it is 
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not.  To highlight an extreme example for the purpose of clarification, according to the legal 
theory of positivism, the laws enacted by the Nazi regime which involved the imprisonment 
and murder of millions of innocent people were valid laws and should be obeyed by both 
citizens and legal officers, such as lawyers and judges.  Certainly a positivist may agree that 
such laws were morally repugnant, but for a positivist that is irrelevant as to the validity of 
the laws themselves.  As long as they have been validly enacted by the sovereign entity, the 
laws are in place and implemented. 
 
The contrasting theory is that of “natural law”, and for the sake of simplicity I will keep to 
the initial properly systematic articulation of natural law by Thomas Aquinas – and even over 
600 years later, this particular theory still has significant traction in scholarly discussions.  
According to Aquinas, all law is ultimately from God, and exists in a tiered system.  At the 
pinnacle is the eternal law of God which exists purely in the divine mind.  By exercise of 
one’s reason, which is participation in the divine mind, one comes upon the next tier, which 
is called the natural law.  Now, because one’s ability to exercise reason is tainted by sin, 
Aquinas argues that we need an intermediate level, which he calls the divine law – this is the 
content contained in the Old and New Testaments, which clarifies our knowledge of the mind 
of God by his self-revelation in Scripture.  With this clarification, we can again exercise our 
reason to delineate the natural law into a specific set of determinations, which is the human 
law or positive law, what we would normally consider to be “law”.  In this schema, all human 
law is ultimately derived from the eternal law, based in reason and justice.  According to 
Aquinas, if a law is against reason or justice, it does not derive from the eternal law – and 
consequently, it is not truly law.  It lacks the essential character of law itself; it is a mere 
shadow or distortion.  Returning to Nazi Germany for a moment, with this kind of framework 
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we can make a very simple argument that the Nazi laws were clearly unjust and immoral, 
against reason itself – and therefore, even though they were validly made, they are not true 
laws and do not carry the obligation to obedience.  This in itself is the subject of much 
discussion, but we must now move on. 
 
So to return to our original question – I think the positivist framework is inherently secular 
and therefore clearly not a strong candidate for a Christian theory of law, but what about the 
Thomist natural law framework?  Could this be a truly “Christian” theory of law?  What I 
would propose is that although it is certainly in the right direction, it is not quite enough.  No 
doubt it is a theistic or moral theory of law – that law is in some way derived from God and 
connected to morality – but that alone, in my view, does not qualify it as a “Christian” theory 
of law.  I think the problem here is that Aquinas’ theory of law, at least on the surface, is 
missing Christ.  In particular, it is missing the foundational “Christian” doctrines of Trinity 
and Incarnation.  My proposal is that a truly “Christian” jurisprudence, a truly Christian 
theory of law, must incorporate the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation – and for this insight 
I am indebted to British theologian John Milbank. 
 
More importantly, it is my argument that a truly Christian jurisprudence opens the possibility 
for a community that exists without legal violence.  A perennial problem in legal philosophy, 
and indeed in philosophy generally, is how to reconcile the One and the Many, the individual 
and the community.  Law is constantly trying to balance this tension.  A law which is too 
specifically catered for a particular problem or individual will not apply beyond that problem 
or individual, leading to an endless series of mandates and prohibitions which are impossible 
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to keep as a community, alienating the community from the individual.  A law which is too 
general and tries to cover everything has no effect at the level of the particular or individual, 
castrating its potency and again alienating the individual from the community.  Law generally 
tries to solve this problem by, ultimately, making more laws –  imposing sovereign power on 
the individual and the community, drawing categories and boundaries around and between 
the individuals within the community, constricting the existence of difference, community 
solidarity, and ultimately, human flourishing.  In this approach, human beings are conceived 
as purely rational, self-interested citizens, entities engaging in relations of contract and 
artifice.   Our intrinsically human characteristics of faith and feeling are completely excluded.  
For example, in the eyes of the law, a corporation is considered just as much a ‘legal person’ 
as you or I.  We can have legal relationships with impersonal, artificial, money-making 
machines because the law views us as in exactly the same way – impersonal, artificial, 
money-making machines.  This is a reason why many theorists today characterise law as 
“violence”. 
 
However, I think that in the Christian doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, we have a 
potential solution which will allow the existence of a human community which is peaceful.  
Consider the term ‘Trinity’ – the Tri-Unity, three in one – perfectly existing unity in 
diversity.  Within the Trinitarian relationship there is a model of love and perfect peace which 
privileges both the individual and the community.  This is revealed to us through the 
Incarnation – Jesus Christ voluntarily sacrificing himself on the cross and rising again for the 
forgiveness of sins and eternal life, peace with God and between humanity by mutual faith or 
trust.  In Christ, we see both the attitude and the act which forms the bond of peace 
mentioned in Colossians 3:14 – that of love.  In particular, this is the ‘law’ of love, to love 
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your neighbour as yourself just as Christ loved us – with full sacrifice, affection, trust, 
forgiveness and patience – the law of the Spirit which produces the fruit of the Spirit in the 
community.  This, I think, provides the foundation for a legal community based in peace and 
mutually beneficial human relationships.  For as the Apostle Paul says in Romans, if you love 
your neighbour as yourself, you will not murder them or steal from them, and so on – and 
more significantly, if you love your neighbour as yourself, it resolves the problem of the 
individual and the community.  The individual loves all members of the community as 
individuals and is loved by them as a community and as individuals.  All are loved in their 
individual differences, yet are loved as part of a loving community and by a loving 
community. 
 
So a truly Christian jurisprudence is one which contains Trinity and Incarnation, the essential 
Christian doctrines which allow reconciliation of the one and the many, as well as provide a 
model for loving your neighbour as yourself.  This can conceptually provide a way to 
instantiate a legal community founded on love, one which eschews and refuses violence and 
gives oneself for the other just as Christ did, and receives this gift with gratitude to pass it on 
– a community of individuals existing in peace. 
